Social Sciences, Humanities and Education Journal (SHE Journal)
Volume 5 (1) 44 – 62, January 2024 | ISSN: 2720-9946 (Online)
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Colonial Roots of the Contemporary Economic Crisis in Subsaharan Africa (SSA): The Case of Nigeria and Tanzania

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Abstract: Tanzania is a low-income oil-importing developing country, with characteristics that typify the vulnerability of a Third World economy, with external debt payment crisis. Nigeria on the other hand, is a mineral-rich oil-exporting country also enmeshed in debt crisis. Sadly, Nigeria has been the region's largest borrower. Both countries have different economic development strategies. While Tanzania with initial socialist bent, capitulated to the conditionalities of multilateral agencies, Nigeria on the other hand followed the path of a mixed economy and later reverted to the capitalist economic mode. This discourse examines the colonial roots of the economic crisis in both Nigeria and Tanzania. The study also x-rays the impacts of British colonial administration on Nigeria and Tanzania, and the political and economic systems that evolved in these colonies. The work found out that the imposition of indirect rule, which meant the superimposition of the colonial method of government on the various indigenous emirates, kingdoms, and tribal chieftaincies in Nigeria and Tanzania was for economic exploitation. The work submits that the underlying motive of colonialism was to ensure the effective and unchallenged exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of British capitalists, and the indirect rule system was intended as the best way to accomplish this end. This exploitation has however continued unabetted into the present-day neo-colonial exploitation aided by both Nigerian and Tanzanian collaborators.

Keywords: Nigeria, Tanzania, British Colonial Administration, Colonial Roots, Economic Crisis, Indirect Rule, Colonial Exploitation.

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Citation: Ishamali, I., & Adie, C. U. (2024). Colonial Roots of the Contemporary Economic Crisis in Subsaharan Africa (SSA): The Case of Nigeria and Tanzania. *Social Sciences, Humanities and Education Journal (SHE Journal)*, *5*(1), 44 – 62.

INTRODUCTION

The economic crisis confronting Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) calls for concern. After an impressive start at independence, SSA today is the poorest and the least developed region in the world, and with a dwindling economy (Akokpari, 2007; Udoette, 2015). Almost three-fourths of the countries in the region are classified in the low-income category. In addition, among all the developing regions in the world, SSA has been the most dependent on foreign financial and technical aid for its development. It may also be noted that SSA has also relied heavily on food aid and food imports and presently has the worst set of social indicators to its credit. As a result of continuous reliance on external aid, the nations that comprise SSA are presently in the throes of severe debt crisis. Out of the 40 countries that are classified as heavily indebted, 33 are in the SSA (Udoette, 2023a; Noyoo, 2022).

The primary focus of the continent is now on debt repayments. Today, SSA is indebted to either the United States, China, or the World Bank, the value of which is more than what they earn annually. At the root of the problem of growth and recovery in SSA lies the phenomenon of the net outward transfer of financial resources by way of negative net transfers on debt (Lippolis & Verhoeven, 2023).

The phenomenon of international borrowings is not a recent development. It came into prominence during the Second World War and increased significantly during the 1970's, and reached a crisis situation in the 1980's. If a country incurs a current account deficit on its balance of payments (BOP), it has to finance the deficit through net inflows of foreign capital. This external capital can come in the form of debt or equity. Debt-creating flows include official development assistance (ODA) and commercial borrowings.

Over the years, developing countries were attracted by the general-purpose nature of bank finance and by the large volumes and flexibility of instruments available at a time when alternative sources of finance were growing very slowly. Some developing countries preferred the low real interest rates charged by banks to the conditionality attached to official finance and the strict creditworthiness standards of bond markets. Commercial borrowings impose repayment obligations that are more demanding than official financing. First, commercial credit is rarely extended on a long-term basis, and recent debt servicing difficulties have increased because of shortened maturity periods. Secondly, there has been a movement towards lending at floating rates by international commercial banks. The increased use of floating-rate debts effectively shifted interest rate risk to borrowing countries.

This phenomenon of the developing countries' debt crisis first manifested during Mexico's August 1982 moratorium on external debt servicing (Udoette, 2015). Prior to this, there was a general belief that if the rate of growth of income exceeded the rate of interest on the debt, there would be no danger either for the lender or for the borrower. The argument was that the borrower could safely repay the debts and continue servicing them because it was generating surplus income. This long-held belief was based on the assumption that other variables, like income, remained unchanged, but this did not happen. One of these key variables, namely, the international economic environment, changed dramatically. The economic growth of advanced nations plummeted. At the same time, real interest rates rose, and the demand for goods from developing nations fell drastically. Moreover, the spending boom in debtor economies was not backed by adequate and efficient investment as well as the production of the requisite amount of assets. SSA had to confront an international environment characterized by sharp declines in world commodity prices and substantial losses in terms of trade. These developments were bound to lead to a debt crisis at some point. The extent to which these external factors actually resulted in debt servicing problems depended crucially on the internal factors. Another perspective, which would be the extent to which internal factors caused debt servicing problems, would depend on the external factors. This discuss investigates the colonial roots of the economic problem in the SSA, using Nigeria and Tanzania as case studies.

DEBT CRISIS AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SSA: A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP

At independence, virtually all countries in the SSA relied excessively on foreign aid to develop their fledgling economies (Umotong, 2023a; Umotong, 2023b). The political independence brought forth by decolonization did not generate economic independence. In fact, the economic dependence of these SSA countries was so intense that they were unable to chart an independent path of growth. Foreign aid brought in its wake, repayment obligations that reinforced underdevelopment rather than mitigated it. A scenario evolved wherein these countries borrowed heavily to overcome economic deficiencies but got progressively enmeshed in a web of debt servicing obligations that these borrowings entailed. They were inexorably driven into a vicious cycle in which underdevelopment fostered a debt crisis, the extrication of which instigated further impoverishment. With the burden of debt escalating, foreign aid, rather than offsetting underdevelopment, began to complement it and could perhaps be identified as the principal underlying cause. When a country gets caught in a debt trap, it becomes such an all-encompassing phenomenon that several explanations could be given as regards its origin, dimensions and solutions.

The origin of the debt crisis in SSA could be traced to the high degrees of underdevelopment that they had to contend with at the time of their independence (Fole, 2003; Umotong, 2023c). These deep-rooted developmental constraints included rapid population growth, low human capital development and inadequate infrastructure. The manifold increase in the dimensions of this debt crisis over time is a reflection of the onerous nature of foreign aid that these countries resorted to rescue themselves. Attempt at finding solution to this crisis, would reveal that this underdevelopment was perpetuated not just during the colonial phase but thereafter by the usurious nature of foreign aid. The nature of the underdevelopment was such that these nations lacked the basic institutions whereby they would be able to gainfully absorb foreign capital and generate returns that would service their creditors. Instead of trying to find a longer-term, sustainable solution to the inability of these countries to repay their initial debts, more debt was contracted to repay the existing ones.

The debt crisis in SSA needs to be perceived in terms of its structural deficiencies, and facile financing solutions which only serves to aggravate an already volatile situation (Young, 2013). This work attempts to establish that the debt crisis in SSA should be understood in terms of a more realistic appreciation of the characteristics of their underdevelopment, and highlight the fact that progressive disregard of these developmental constraints engendered the debt crisis. Let's examine the scenario in the two countries seriatim.

NIGERIA

It is opined that there was nothing inherently fractious about the precolonial Nigerian polity. Despite the illogical, colonially imposed territorial boundaries, a number of pre-conditions were present that, differently understood and acted upon, might have contributed towards a unified, stable, and symmetrically evolving Nigerian nation-state (Udoette, 2023b). Economically, the regions, with their different resources and products, could have complemented rather than competed with each other. Ethnically, no one group was in a position to dominate all the other groups. In general, a substantial number of factors were present that might have shaped the great diversity of Nigeria into a broad, integrated and functional whole.

However, colonialism eclipsed these possibilities and established instead a system of rule that the impacts were felt in different ways in the post-independence economy and society. The historical role of colonialism was not so much that of the creation of the forces and conditions tending to fragment the Nigerian nation-state as it was that of the manipulation and exacerbation of those diverse factors that differentiated the country. As a consequence of colonial policy, the very political boundaries set by the colonial administration were arbitrary and scarcely related to the subject of people's historical experiences. The system of indirect rule pursued by the colonialists absolutized regional and ethnic differences, while colonial capitalism, for reasons of its own internal logic, sectionalized and regionalized the national economy. The results were interethnic competition, the formation of a dependent successor elite, continuing dependent development, and hence the creation of the major precondition for neo-colonialism following formal independence.

'Nigeria' as we know it today did not exist until 1914. The people who inhabited the region now known as Nigeria had always lived in separate societies (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The frontiers of these societies were constantly shifting, but at all times they ranged outside those enclosed by the British immigrants. West Africa, with its varied physical features (mangrove swamps, rain forests, savannah and desert), and consequent cultural differentiation comprised of different empires. These empires operating within their own economic and geographical situations, carried on trade amongst each other, and some of the goods found their way into Europe. The Europeans, that is, the Portuguese, first arrived in the 15th century, and soon after trade began, which started with human commodities (slaves), since slavery was common throughout West African commercial or military transactions. The Dutch, the British, the French, and the Spaniards followed the Portuguese, and the slave trade became the most important basis of commercial transactions between the West Africans and Europeans. For the greater part of four centuries, this trade dominated relations between the two peoples.

THE IMPOSITION OF BRITISH AUTHORITY

The first specific occasion for the British to assert control over this region arose out of their efforts towards the anti-slave trade campaign. Since the slave trade was no longer profitable for Britain, they concentrated all their efforts on the abolition of this trade in West Africa. In this regard, Britain had to resort to force in order to ensure its stoppage once and for all and thereby attacked the main power centres like Bonny in 1836 and Lagos in 1851. King Kosoko of Lagos was removed from power for slave-trading, and the British administration, with their stooge Akitoye, who replaced Kosoko, signed treaties that were in effect warrants of occupation. Gradually, other coastal towns signed anti-slavery treaties, and puppet kings were installed in all of them (Everill, 2012).

The success of a British voyage up to the Niger in 1854 and the trading profits it made helped to stimulate the appetite for expansion. Traders from London, Glasgow, and Manchester, who had hitherto been excluded by the Liverpool-African middlemen monopoly, began to participate actively in trade with this region (Pearson,1971). These traders were accompanied by naval ships on their trading expeditions. Thus, since trade with this region was lucrative, the British officials decided to exercise greater control over it. Thus, by 1861, Lagos had become a British colony with a governor appointed, and intervention in the hinterland followed thereafter.

ATTEMPTS AT ESTABLISHING MONOPOLY TRADE

It was at this stage that a decisive factor entered into both the commercial and political situations. The British trading posts along the rivers were bringing in large profits, but they were placed in jeopardy owing to attacks by Africans. The chief weakness of the British merchants was division of control and direction, as the main companies came from separate cities like Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow and London. In addition to this was the competition with France and Germany, whereby Britain dispatched George Goldie, an enterprising British merchant, to Nigeria. There were four British companies in operation in Nigeria in 1878. George Goldie molded the four British companies into one monopolistic group known as the United African Company (U.A.C.) in 1879, and organized the National African Company in 1882 to force the French out of business. Goldie managed to completely weed out French influence from the area in 1884 after concluding 37 treaties with local chiefs (Okediji, 1972). The protectorate of Niger Districts came about in 1885. The Oil Rivers Protectorate was proclaimed for areas under the British Consul whose rulers had signed treaties with the company agents in 1887, and in 1893 it became the Niger Coast Protectorate (Okediji, 1972).

THE GRANTING OF CHARTERS

After the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, Goldie secured a charter for his company (1886) that enabled it to administer justice and maintain security, thereby establishing a virtual protectorate (Lustig, 2020). The charter was granted by the British Government to saddle the merchants with the responsibilities of administration, justice, and security. Theoretically, the British government passed it over to Goldie's company, now the Royal Niger Company. Most of its responsibilities were outlined at the Berlin Conference.

THE RULE OF THE CROWN

The Royal Niger Company, however, was not able to carry out its duties efficiently owing to limited capital and a lack of interest in economic development, which created bitterness against the company. By the late nineteenth century, Britain had completely changed its former methods of operation. This was largely out of fear of French and German interference and the commercial conflict around the oil rivers and up the Niger. Britain started taking control of the areas in the official manner that governments had previously tried to avoid by bringing customs duties and military forces under official authority. At the same time, rulers (local chiefs) were given subsidies from central revenue, which could be interpreted to mean a complete loss of sovereignty.

On January 1, 1900, the charter of the Royal Niger Company was abrogated, and the British Government took over the administration of the lands (Aloko, 2023). Territories in the south were added to the Niger Coast Protectorate to form the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Treaties signed with northern rulers over the northeastern region led to the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Lagos, with the whole of Yorubaland under the effective control of the Lagos Government, remained a colony.

Sir Frederick Lugard was entrusted with the work of establishing a British administration for the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, which he accomplished through a series of military expeditions extending up to 1906 (Aloko, 2023). The colonial office was already administering Lagos and was henceforth responsible for the government of all three British territories in Nigeria. The two protectorates posed very different problems for administration. The northern was more than twice the size of the southern, and its communications were rudimentary. Northern Nigeria had very little economic activity on which British officials could count to supply the revenues that would pay for their administration. The height of the trans-Saharan trade had probably been reached around 1875, and since then it has declined. Internal trade still continued, both across the Sahara and to the south, but it was hardly of the nature that would produce revenue from duties. Furthermore, since there was no seacoast, the usual colonial revenues accruing from customs duties were not available.

In the southern protectorate, the situation was vastly different. They had the lucrative palm oil trade, and Lagos and the Delta Ports offered a rich harvest in customs duties (throughout Yorubaland and Iboland, market economies had formed the keystone of social life for centuries), and so, sources of revenue were unconstrained. The main difficulty faced by the British in the Southern Province was the absence of powerful kings and chiefs. Large centralized states did not exist, and no one could negotiate on behalf of a considerable number of people. In the North and Yorubaland, it was possible to undertake some form of negotiation with a leader who could represent his people. In the south, the Aro, the main traders, were targeted by the British, and they tried to crush them militarily. However, the defeat of the Aros did not legitimize British rule in the south, and nothing short of force, used over many years, could bring the villagers to accept the British as their rulers.

THE AMALGAMATION

Northern Nigeria, as stated before, lacked sufficient funds to provide for direct administration by British officials, and it was becoming difficult to find enough funds to enable the central administration to develop the transport and other services that the country required (Ezera, 1964). In addition, the bulk of Northern Nigeria's trade passed through Lagos, with the customs revenue going to the Southern States. In 1906, Lugard opined that the three separate British administrations in Nigeria should be amalgamated, whereby Northern Nigeria would benefit from the commercial prosperity of the South, a planned revenue system could be developed for the whole country, and administrative expenses could also be reduced (Ojo, 2014). However, the British Government did not agree to the greater amalgamation advocated by Lugard, and in 1906, the governments of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were merged to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. However, by 1914, the British government agreed to Lugard's proposal, and Lugard became the Governor-General of the whole of Nigeria.

Thereafter, Britain took a unilateral decision, without seeking the opinion of the people, that all the communities should suddenly be combined into a single political unit. In 1900, it was decided that the country would be governed as three units, in 1906 as two, and in 1914, a single Nigerian entity was created. Yet at all stages, the different areas of the country had been governed separately, according to contrasting principles. The northern emirates, the pagan societies of the middle belt, Yoruba town, Ibo village clans, the delta ports and Lagos had all experienced varying dispensations under their respective British rulers. The two Nigerian protectorates and the colony of Lagos represented the fact that the partition arranged by the Europeans paid scant attention to the realities of African life. The frontiers were frequently decided by the manoeuvres of European armies. They cut through established African communities, ignored geographical factors and divided the areas into economic units. The presumption that they could simply be thrown together and governed as one political entity, revealed their total lack of information of the situation.

The British provided a skeletal communications network, and the consequent expansion of trade, together with the education opportunities supplied mainly by missionaries, increased mobility between the communities. A close examination of these factors reveals that they rather aggravated than assuaged intercommunal suspicions. Economic and social growth had been markedly uneven, leading to a gross regional imbalance, which in turn resulted in the appropriation of most of the socio-economic benefits from comparatively rich areas, such as the Yoruba West. Poorer regions, such as the Ibo east and the pagan center, had sought to compensate for their weaknesses by sending many of their people to other areas to find employment, and the large mass of the north had remained underdeveloped (Iliffe, 1987). Owing to the absence of a single national sentiment and the conflict between religious and social traditions, the emigrants did not seek to transmit their knowledge or skills to the people among whom they settled. Their main object was to gain salaries by trading profits unattainable at home. They therefore remained largely alien elements, enjoying a little cultural exchange and, at times, bitterly resented by their neighbours.

ECONOMIC GROWTH UNDER COLONIAL RULE

Nigeria was potentially rich, and its growth took some time owing to the inaccessibility of the North. At an early stage in the country's history, the construction of railway lines began to make Northern Nigeria more accessible to the sea, and it started exporting hides, skins, cotton, and groundnuts (Udo, 1970). By 1950, groundnuts alone accounted for one-sixth of all Nigeria's exports, and the North produced about one-quarter of all Nigerian exports (Udo, 1970).

The mainstay of the Nigerian economy was the export of palm oil and kernels from the coastal districts. Palm was produced by the south, and cocoa by the south-west. These two crops accounted for, respectively, one-third and one-quarter of the value of Nigeria's exports in 1950.

Although Nigeria was an important producer of tin and had at Enugu the only coal mine in West Africa, her trade and prosperity depended on the export of agricultural products.

THE REALITY: CASH CROP AGRICULTURE

These huge export values represent only part of the economic surplus from agriculture in colonial Nigeria. The terms of trade were extremely unfavourable for Nigeria, and much of the surplus was transferred to Britain through monopolistic pricing. Producer incomes associated with these export values under the Marketing Board system were generally much below world prices.

Technologically, even though agrarian capitalism experienced some innovations involving new seeds, crop research, insecticides, harvesting, and oil extraction machines, the basic techniques for land clearing and cultivation remained stagnant under the hoe and cutlass culture. Modern agricultural machinery like tractors, ploughs, harvesters, and milk processors were never introduced into the country.

FOOD CROP AGRICULTURE

Agricultural production for internal consumption in colonial Nigeria consisted of seasonal crops, including root crops such as yam, cocoyam, cassava, and potato, and cereals such as maize, rice, millet, guinea yam, and beans. These food crops constitute the subsistence production of household peasant cultivation on small plots.

The static nature of food production and its backward technology were part of the cumulative consequence of the near total neglect of food production. The indigenous labour force had to feed itself as well as pay taxes. In terms of relative size, export of agricultural produce engaged some 85% of the Nigerian population during most of the colonial era. During the 1900–1929 boom period, food output rose by only about 10%, and agricultural export production rose by 500% (Richards, 2023). Therefore, in spite of huge differences in input in terms of employment, both the absolute and relative increase in the production of cash crops exceeded that of food products.

MINING

The mining of all minerals except coal was carried out by private commercial companies. The important minerals were tin, columbite, coal, petroleum, gold, salt, silver, and lead. Mineral expropriation was further facilitated by the availability of cheap Nigerian labour. The terms of trade in imports and exports were extremely unfavourable. For example, during 1911–53, Nigerians could buy British goods only to the extent of about one-third, on average, of the products Britain exported from Nigeria because the income terms of trade were an average of about 33 1/3 percent (Purdie, 2018).

Domestic Trade

Domestic trade was among the greatest casualties of colonial trade in Nigeria. Imported manufacturers, on account of their cheapness through mass production, soon displaced many traditional products of domestic trade. The flourishing domestic trade in cotton goods, salt, ornaments, cutlery, canoes, gin marches, etc., declined as the producers and traders of these commodities faced a vanishing demand for their products on account of the imported substitutes. This nevertheless induced them to tap the lucrative export products. Moreover, as transportation and other infrastructural facilities were now geared to export from north to south and towards the inland distribution of new imports, domestic trade faced further setbacks.

INDUSTRY

The industrial sector in Nigeria, like all colonized nations, faced the problem of lack of capital arising from low incomes, illiteracy, a lack of technical education, and a preference for cash-crop agriculture. These were, in fact, the symptoms of colonial underdevelopment in general.

The British colonial rulers wanted to maintain their monopoly over raw materials, technology, and the markets for manufacturers. Moreover, the colonialist policy of expanding the import of manufacturers and encouraging the export of raw materials had the dual effect of eliminating both the market for domestic manufacturers and the domestic supply of raw materials to Nigerian industries.

TECHNOLOGICAL BACKWARDNESS AND FORCED LABOUR

Before colonialism, the indigenous people designed and operated their own techniques. After the imposition of colonialism, indigenous craft workers and artisans, whose industries and trade were destroyed, found no alternative technical employment in new industries. The imported machinery and equipment simply created technological confusion and rootlessness, given the largely illiterate and unskilled labour force with no scope for technical education. Forced labour was practiced by the British colonialists in Nigeria for mining, public works, and plantation agriculture for palm produce, rubber, cocoa, and cotton. They worked under abominable conditions with very poor wages.

Thus, the colonial economy that evolved in Nigeria was entirely structured to meet the needs of the British colonial masters. No development in the economic sector could be said to have been to the benefit of the indigenous Nigerians, and the component of private commercial enterprises was so high that, at independence, their continuation was inevitable. Actually, no national bourgeoisie could emerge in Nigeria as the colonial Governors, District Officers, Military and Police Officers, Merchants, Financiers, Shipping Magnates, and others constituted the bulk of the imperialist bourgeoisie. Subordinate to this group was the Nigerian indigenous petty-bourgeoisie, which consisted of four strata.

First, there were feudal chiefs, or natural rulers, called emirs in the north, obas in the south-west, and obis in the south-east of Nigeria. Second, there were the indigenous coastal aristocrats of Lagos, Calabar, Bonny, etc., who were also colonial intermediaries (Godlewski, 2015). They consisted of merchants, squeezing in between the big imperialist firms and the peasant producers.

The third group was comprised of professionals like lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers, and journalists, and the fourth included clerks in the public and private sectors, indigenous soldiers, and policemen. The last three strata have been jointly labelled as the middle class.

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

The fundamental Nigerian crisis could most appropriately be dated to 1914, as the creation of one nation inevitably resulted in an ossification of regional separation. The growth of a common political consciousness could only have been achieved through the lowering of barriers between ethnic groups.

By 1945, not only had the framework of British policy hardened, but most African opinion in Nigeria could not accept the shape of the structure that had been erected (Ade-Ibijola, 2014). Hostility between the two major southern groups, the Igbo and Yoruba, had deepened into bitterness. The gulf between the south and the north was rapidly widening. Different ethnic groups representing different tribal interests were being formed. These groups could be basically cultural associations, designed to protect the existence of particular communal cultures. As such, they would have been legitimate, even constructive, maintaining cultural diversity within political unity. But political unity, unfortunately, had not been created. Thus, these groups inevitably turned to politics, with the result that cultural preservation was transformed into political separatism.

The longest region in the country, the northern region, was dominated by the Northern People's Congress (NPC), led by Ahmad Bello, which was rooted in the traditional Hausa-Fulani elite. The Eastern region was dominated by the 'National Council for Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) under the leadership of Dr. Azikiwe, which attracted Igbo support. While the western region was under the Yoruba, whose political entity was the Action Group led by Awolowo, As noted earlier, legislative councils with limited African representation were created in 1922 (Ade-Ibijola, 2014). But much of the administration remained under the control of traditional native rulers, supervised by the colonial authorities. In 1944, Britain introduced a new Nigerian constitution, establishing a federal system of government based on three regions: the eastern, the western, and the northern. The federal arrangement was an attempt to reconcile regional tensions.

The Nationalist Movement, which first began in 1937 with the organization of the Nigerian Youth Movement and later spilled into the three parties mentioned above, demanded the extension of the franchise and the holding of direct elections. In 1949, the Constitution of 1947 (the Richards Constitution) was abrogated. A ministerial government was introduced in 1951 under the McPherson Constitution and self-government under the Lyttleton Constitution in 1954 (Abdallah & Mansouri, 2022).

The three political parties had varying demands. The NPC, for instance, demanded the highest representation and protection of Islam. The NCNC favoured the establishment of a centralized government and demanded an equal distribution of revenue. And the AG demanded regional autonomy with a view to ensuring that the massive earnings from the cocoa industry would accrue to the Western region alone.

In 1954, an agreement was reached for the establishment of a federal government structure with defence, police force, finance, and banking under its domain. Education, agriculture, health services, and economic development were to be the responsibility of the specific regions (Abdallah & Mansouri, 2022). The Western and Eastern regions were granted self-government in 1956, and the Northern region in 1959. General elections took place in 1959 for the federal legislature, where none of the parties secured a majority. The Northern Region got the maximum number of votes and managed to come to power by leading a coalition of the NPC and NCNC. Thus, independence came in 1960 with the grant of a bicameral federal parliament. However, this is not to deny the role of the nationalist leaders, primarily from the three main groups, in coordinating all elements of discontent into the common purpose of independence.

OBSERVATIONS

Nigeria's independence could only be deemed to be independent politically. Economically, the legacy was such that it was very difficult to make a breakthrough in the existing system. Foreign monopoly capital continued to dominate in urban areas and strategic sectors of the economy such as manufacturing, mining, petroleum, finance, transport and communication. The agricultural sector continued to be dominated by cash crop production, which was totally dependent on world market demand, and food crop production was completely neglected. Moreover, the political system (adoption of the Westminster Model of parliamentary government and federalism) that was inherited established a governing structure whose origins and development lay outside the Nigerian socio-historical experience. This set off a process of constitutional transformation whose result can be seen in the succession of military and civilian governments since 1960.

TANZANIA

Tanzania, formally known as the United Republic of Tanzania, consists of the former countries of Tanganyika (which became independent on December 10, 1961) and Zanzibar (whose independence was granted on December 10, 1963) (Mwakikagile, 2016). Following a revolution in Zanzibar, a union between these two countries was declared by their presidents on April 25, 1964. Tanzania, at independence, was characterized by a peasant economy, low rates of literacy, little urbanization, and the other incumbents of a newly independent African state. Following three decades of self-rule, the above characteristics still typify Tanzania (Mwakikagile, 2016). For a better understanding of the current situation, it is necessary to examine the genesis of colonial rule and x-ray the political economy of colonialism, wherein lie the roots of present-day Tanzania.

Numerous tribes inhabited mainland Tanganyika from time immemorial. The political system existing in Tanganyika ranged from complete statelessness to chiefdoms administered by appointed officers. It may be observed that these states were not necessarily more advanced than stateless societies. Many of Africa's most cultured people were stateless, which can be considered adaptations to different circumstances. Until the end of the eighteenth century, most of the Tanganyikan societies in the interiors did not have economic exchanges with the outside world. Their economies were symmetrical and internally integrated. It was primarily a subsistence economy, and the surplus was retained within each community, which, in turn, reposed distinctiveness upon it.

The coast, on the other hand, had commercial contact with the outside world for more than two thousand years. It engaged in trade with luxuries like ivory and gold and staples like mangrove poles and grains, and at times with slaves. Manufactured commodities like iron tools, arms, cloth, and beads were imported. Numerous city-states grew up along the coast as a result of this trade, and the mixed coastal population evolved its own distinctive Swahili culture.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to make extensive forays into the Indian Ocean region in the fifteenth century. They established their own trading network along the East African coast, disrupting the existing commercial network. As a consequence of this loss of control over the arteries of trade, the economy of the East African coast suffered serious setbacks. In the new system, the eastern coast supplied essential provisions to the Portuguese vessels and paid iron and gold in return for spices from Asia. Though Portuguese control over the East African coast was not absolute, the disruption of the Indian Ocean economic system and the ruthless exploitation of eastern Africa gradually sapped the prosperity of the city states.

The Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean region did not last long. Portugal was just emerging out of feudalism and was not able to channel the wealth looted from the East into the productive development of its economy (Newitt, 2004). Its frail economy was thus unable to sustain extensive conquest of the major centres of population in the East. In the meantime, the Dutch and English traders were moving strongly into the Indian Ocean region. Very shortly, the English and the Dutch established their own trading companies in the Indian Ocean, and the Portuguese hold over the arteries of trade in the region weakened. The Arab traders were considerably inconvenienced by the Portuguese operations and took this opportunity to drive them out of Muscat in 1650 (Newitt, 2004).

The Arabs wanted to explore the commercial possibilities in the East African waters. The Swahili city-states were only too happy to find an ally in the Arabs, with whose help they drove out the Portuguese from the East African Coast in 1698. This was followed by Arab political and economic dominance over the East African Coast (Newitt, 2004).

The Omani Arabs, after breaking Portuguese dominance over the East African Coast, did not establish a strong, centralized empire of their own. The Omani domain was a loose confederation of Arab traders, at times bound by common interest but more often by rivalry and factionalism. The very geography of the Omani domain was such that it was mapped along three thousand miles of coastline from the Persian Gulf to Cape Delgado. It was therefore evidently difficult to ensure a strong administration.

NATURE OF THE ECONOMY DURING OMANI RULE

The Omani Arabs established a trading network whereby East Africa's main function came to be the supply of slaves. The Omani Arabs established plantation economies for dates, using East African slave labour. These dates were exported to British India, from where they were re-exported to Europe (Udofia, 2021; Udofia¸ 2023). So East Africa and Oman were integrated into the international trading network, the former as the supplier of slave labour and the latter as the supplier of slave-grown dates.

The inland people of Tanganyika made contact with the outside world in the nineteenth century through the long-distance trading system based on Zanzibar. Zanzibar could be regarded as a satellite of Europe's growing power in the Indian Ocean. These coastal colonies did not exercise direct political control over the interior. But by developing an alliance with certain classes of African merchants, they managed to influence large areas.

East Africa was initially integrated into the international trading network through the supply of slave labour for Arab-grown date plantations. In the later part of the eighteenth century, the demand for slaves went up further. In particular, it was the increasing French demand for slaves that fueled further extension of the trade. The French required slave labour for sugar plantations on their Indian Ocean islands of Mauritius and Reunion. They started taking away nearly two thousand slaves per year from the coast of Tanganyika following the rising demand for slaves in America and the rise in the price of slaves on the West Coast. The French sought to gain control by signing treaties with Swahili rulers.

The French slave trade suffered serious setbacks following their naval warfare with the British from the end of the eighteenth century (Umotong¸ 2000; Umotong, 2011). The British, who had embarked upon industrialization found slavery very unprofitable. It sought to abolish the slave trade on the East African coast. In this regard they started anti-slavery patrols in the Indian Ocean waters and by 1822, made the Omani Arabs sign a treaty banning the export of slaves (Suzuki¸2017).

Following the end of the slave trade, the merchants looking for an alternative began the clove plantation economy in Zanzibar, absorbing large amounts of slave labour. The clove plantation economy started extending further along the coast as it generated tremendous international demand. Over and above clove, the Zanzibar economic base developed around ivory and rubber. Rubber plantations employing slave labour from the interior also developed extensively. The supply of ivory came exclusively from the deep interiors of Tanganyika, which prompted the Arabs to exert greater influence over the mainland to develop the lucrative ivory trade with the West.

IMPACT OF TANGANYIKA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

The impact of this commercial contact between the island and Europe is that it drew the whole of present-day Tanzania into the international trading network. The incorporation of Tanganyika into this economic system went through various stages. It created specific classes of people who thrived on international trade. They can be classed together as the compradors who served as the local commercial agents and who sought to perpetrate the international connection by which they prospered.

One can identify two aspects of the economic exploitation of Tanganyika in the nineteenth century. First is the export of labour in the form of slaves; second is the use of labour within Tanganyika for the production of commodities for export, which had very little local use. Tanganyika mainly produced raw materials like dike clove, rubber, ivory, gum, and copal for export to Europe, North America, and India. In exchange, Tanganyika received manufactured goods in their final form, like textiles, metal ware, and guns, which hindered the development of existing comparable industries. Tanganyika also imported luxuries to be consumed by the compradors, like copper, glass beads, and brass wires.

The consequences of this economic integration varied for different regions of Tanganyika. In areas such as Usambara and Upare, the kingdoms had their economic base in the highlands (Kimambo & Maddox, 2019). These kingdoms faced disintegration as the long-distance trade passing along the plains created a rival economic base. For the states that occupied strategic positions, long-distance trade proved to be beneficial. These states amassed a lot of wealth from the long-distance trade. This enabled them to exercise their hegemony over smaller states, which, in turn, led to the establishment of larger empires. The cases in point were Kilimanjaro and Nyamwezi. The regions that were the main suppliers of slave labour were the worst affected. Example was southern Tanganyika, which went through a tumultuous period of dislocation of its own people, which created severe social disruptions. It can be observed that by the nineteenth century, Tanganyika could be described as a veritable colonial, or rather postcolonial economy being exploited for its natural and human resources. Economies of the interior like Nyamwezi and Yao focused upon hunting and transporting ivory and slaves to the coast (Kimambo & Maddox, 2019). As a result, the mainstays of the economy, agriculture and industry took a backseat as the entire labour force concentrated upon trading. Consequently, the external dependence of these economies increased. Internal coordination between production and consumption was lacking, and the economies could not grow as they were being divided into suppliers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured goods. Ironically, indigenous industries and agricultural practices survived to a certain extent, as the absence of an effective transportation network prevented penetration into the entire area. However, the subsequent establishment of railways during the colonial period had the effect of removing this buffer.

IDEOLOGICAL APPARATUS DURING COLONIAL RULE

The principal apparatuses during colonial rule were the religious apparatus and the colonial education system. Their chief function was to reinforce the colonial class structure. This was done through:

1. Mass ideological work, that is, spreading the ideology of the colonies.
2. Training of cadres for the colonial administrative system.
3. Assisting the delayed development of the colonial productive forces by:
    a. Training craftsmen.
    b. Imparting agricultural education.
    c. Spreading cash crop production.
    d. Ensuring their own reproduction by training local priests and teachers

The ideological apparatus also contributed significantly to the evolution of the colonial class structure. They further produced the future gravediggers of colonial rule. These products of colonial education, however, were also qualified to man the neo-colonial state apparatus.

THE DOMINATING CLASS

The class that dominated the ideological apparatus was also the ruling class in the territory. This was the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The ideological apparatus basically functions to serve its interests and justify its rule. This absentee ruling class resided in the metropole, and its interests in the colony were taken care of by managers and agents of large European firms, civil servants, military officers, and European missionaries. The European settlers in Tanganyika comprised a potentially dominant class.

THE DOMINANT CLASSES

They were the most exploited classes in colonial society, namely the peasantry and the proletariat. Colonialism accelerated the process of peasantization already at work in some areas. This entailed the drawing of cultivating groups, which, hitherto, had produced many for their own subsistence and had perhaps engaged in barter exchange with neighbouring groups, into a commercial orbit. Now the peasants produced export crops for the world market or food crops for towns and plantations and was involved in a money economy.

The proletariat comprised those who sold their productive labour power in return for wages.

THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE

The petty bourgeoisie was central to the ideological apparatus in the sense that it was not a product of the functioning of these apparatuses. The characteristic feature of the petty bourgeoisie was that its members had benefited from colonial education. They received a regular income without engaging in manual labour. The growth of the petty bourgeoisie was fostered by the development of cash crop production and the expansion of the colonial state apparatus and the colonial ideological apparatuses at this historical juncture. It can be subdivided into two substrata.

<u>Upper Level:</u> recruited mostly from chiefly or well-to-do families, civil servants, chiefs, and Kulak farmers.

<u>Lower Level:</u> Included here were church workers, teachers, clerks, interpreters, lower ranks of the armed forces, etc.

THE COMMERCIAL BOURGEOISIE

This class, which was central to the process of surplus appropriation, was only incidental in relation to the ideological apparatuses. The commercial bourgeoisie, which had dominated the coastal areas before colonial rule, was converted by colonialism into a dependent commercial bourgeoisie.

The ranks of this “commercial bourgeoisie” were swelled by migrants from the Indian subcontinent. By 1961, there were 6223 Indians in Tanganyika, most of them traders (Kisanga, 1991). This class consisted of owners of large trading firms and forged strong links with the colonial government and European companies.

These traders were indispensable as commercial intermediaries between European firms and the natives. But the commercial bourgeoisie faced strong hostility from the European settlers, who considered them competitors.

THE METROPOLITAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

The First Phase

There were some changes in the Tanganyikan economy following the British colonialists’ accession to power. No single British company acquired the preeminence of the German East Africa Company. Tanganyika was interlinked with Britain’s colonial empire in East Africa via Kenya. Moreover, the British attempted to surpass all production records. In this regard, the British government extended the infrastructure of roads, bridges, and telegraphs. Minimizing activities were considerably enhanced. Production of cotton, coffee, groundnuts, sesame, rice, hides, and ghee were among the peasant commodities that showed significant improvement. Increased output, however, was achieved by taxation, by force, and by administrative persuasion.

Improvements also took place in the plantation sector as the area under sisal was extended and production went up. Equally significant was the corresponding increase in labour and the sources of migrant labour. Thus, by the end of the first decade of British rule in Tanganyika, the value of agricultural and pastoral products exported had gone up considerably.

The Tanganyikan economy had become so integrated with the international economy that it became subject to the experiences of the developed economies of the world. Thus, Tanganyika did not escape the recessions of 1907-8, 1921, and 1925 (Kisanga, 1991). The most catastrophic great depression of 1930–33 affected Tanganyika severely in its sisal, cotton, and coffee products. Pastoral farmers were largely hit by the falling prices for hides, and food crop growers could not escape the slump either.

Second Phase

During the second phase, the British government was primarily guided by the principle of 'development' in Tanganyika, which can be interpreted to mean enhanced economic activity in the colonial context. In other words, increased economic activity entailed increased production of export articles like sisal, raw cotton, coffee, and cashew nuts, which the Tanganyikan environment was best suited to produce. However, increased productivity of these items would not benefit the Tanganyikans in any way. The metropolitan countries already had developed industries, and markets for raw materials existed. Additional sources of raw materials would reduce the reliance of those industries on these sources, while the producers of the raw materials would become more dependent on the markets. Thus, development was fostered through this process of increased dependence.

In this regard, the colonial government went in for larger measures of regulation of the Tanganyikan economy. The motivation of this regulation and the methods and contents clearly indicate that they were intended to sub serve the interests of the colonial master.

For instance, direct regulation was not considered necessary with regard to sisal, which was grown almost entirely by immigrants on plantations. On the other hand, stringent regulations were observed with regard to cotton and coffee grown primarily by Africans, so much so that it led to riots in certain areas. Likewise, food crops were grown forcibly as famine reserves. The colonial state was moving towards monopoly marketing of both the main African crops.

During the war period, intervention increased even further as the existing system of exporting crops became difficult to operate and the war demanded enhanced production and prioritized production, that is, crops that were vital to the British economy at that point in time.

Cotton and sisal exports were affected as shipping of sisal became difficult and cotton markets did not open up owing to the war. In order for the war to be won with Germany, it was necessary for the entire exportable surplus to be available for the war effort. So, the Britishers demanded that the chiefs and the growers increase their productivity via forced labour. Earlier, economic production of any crop that provided revenue was encouraged. But owing to the war, cotton growing was not favoured as it could be imported from the United States. On the other hand, sisal was encouraged as it increased food production as sisal twine was an important raw material in the mechanical reaping of Britain's corn. Moreover, groundnuts and rice were encouraged in place of cotton.

State regulation of production was achieved primarily by force. The sisal industry, run by Europeans and Asians, was left largely to regulate itself. With regard to the Africans, they passed various regulations to extend their powers of compulsion, like the Defence Regulations of 1940 and the Native Authority Ordinance of 1942 (Williams, 2021). All this had a negative impact on the African farmer, whose income was very low, as he was paid only two-thirds of the value of the crop, and much of it was being taken away in taxes. Consequently, the Tanganyikan population was becoming considerably impoverished.

By 1945, the Tanganyikan economy had become completely integrated with the metropolitan economy, and it was governed to entirely cater to colonial interests (Williams, 2021). The British economy was considerably affected owing to the war, and they decided to use the colonies fully to rectify the situation. In this regard, Tanganyika's import demands from other parts, like the United States, were cut down, and exports of coffee, cotton, and sisal were boosted even further. The whole economy was geared towards expert production. To make matters worse, the funds available from Tanganyika trading surpluses were invested mainly in Britain.

The Third Phase

The period 1953–61 was one of further increased production. There was, however, apparently some relaxation of government pressure. Trade unions were formed, and farmer co-operatives also came up so that the growers could strengthen their own position against the buyers (Williams, 2021). However, it may be observed that there were a lot of restrictions, as all trade unions and individual members were required to register themselves so that their activities could be monitored. In effect, the rules for registration were so rigid that they were virtually meant to suppress union activity. With regard to cooperatives, initiative on the part of African growers was considerably restrained. This relaxation of government pressure, on the face of it, was actually meant to ensure that the economy continues to operate in Britain's interests after independence, which seemed not too far away.

At this point in time, the British colonialists felt that it was unwise to finance 'development' efforts from profits from the sale of African-grown cash crops. Capital would now come from outside the country, but with an appendage of political guarantees of stability and observances against nationalization, without compensation. But in this regard, the government made investments in areas where it expected quick profits. For example, Shell BP spent ¥1 million prospecting for oil in Tanganyika in 1957 (Steyn, 2009). Yet no finance was forthcoming to extract and use the vast coal and iron deposits known to exist in the Songea area, as the government decided not to build a railway without which extraction could not be carried out.

Investments were only made in the mining sector. Secondary industries were encouraged, which could hinder British exports of machines and capital goods. Another reason for the low level of industrialization was the discouragement of all investors (like Asian capitalists), except multi-national companies. For example, British-American tobacco was granted a license in 1960, when such licenses had previously been refused to local Asians. The whole economy was structured in such a manner that there was very little scope for diversity. British colonialists, despite pronouncements of 'development' towards the end, were only guided by their own profit motive and tried to ensure the continuation of the same structure after independence, whereby Tanganyika would continue to be dependent on Britain. A powerful and dynamic modern sector led by a vigorous and self-confident African middle class never arose. There were very few African commercial and manufacturing entrepreneurs, and the extensive cash crop farming produced few substantial African commercial farmers. But no substantive manpower development took place. Thus, at independence, it was impossible for Tanganyika to embark upon an independent path of development, and the orientation of its education system and of its economy ensured that Tanganyika still turned primarily to Britain for foreign assistance, expatriate staff, and overall economic development.

ROOTS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

Thus, after an examination of the colonial rule in Nigeria and Tanzania, the following generalizations can be made with regards to its impact on these two countries. The Indirect Rule was adopted to serve and promote the interests of the colonial masters. Its continuance in power largely depended on the cooperation of local authorities whose power was rooted in traditional forms of social organization. As a result, a situation of dichotomy arose whereby a series of capitalist states emerged with deep roots in non-capitalist societies. These non-capitalist societies were hindered from evolving into full-fledged capitalist societies. One effect of this contradiction was the increasing undermining of pre-colonial socio-economic structures, while at the same time failing to transform the societies so as to enable them cope with the requirements of the new capitalist order. Those areas that were of interest to foreign companies were integrated, and self-sufficient villages and communities in proximate locations to crop or mineral production were eroded. The output generated was used for consumption and processing in industries overseas. The process was such that the peasants converted their land, labor power, and produce into commodities that were intended for sale in overseas markets. These had little or no impact on the communities from which they were extracted. Besides, colonial capitalism destroyed the once thriving economies and communal bonds, and converted them into dependent peasant producers.

Traditional patrons, chiefs, and noblemen either adapted to the exigencies of the new economy or yielded a good portion of their authority to groups more inclined towards collaboration. The traditional rulers' raison d'être, namely their organic links to their communities and their subjects, was thus further eroded. Moreover, the role of the chiefs increasingly became that of enforcers and autocrats, backed by the coercive power of the laws of the colonial regime. Under colonialism, the state was the principal employer, the largest source of finance, and the vehicle for the most rapid accumulation of wealth, status, and power. Independence entrenched the ruling structure produced under the colonial regime, and the elites that guided these nations to independence, ensured that the established order was maintained. This was further accomplished by ensuring that to be a part of the system, you were either well placed in the bureaucracy, as in Tanzania, or in control of regional power centres, as in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

This study posits that the colonial regimes in Nigeria and Tanzania bequeathed faulty economic, social and political structures that are the roots of the economic crisis and underdevelopment of these countries. This may have been deliberately conceived and implemented by the colonial authorities to ensure that the colonized nations remain dependent even after independence. The political structures they bequeathed were essentially Western in character and could not be easily adaptable to the prevailing traditional socio-political institutions. This inevitably led to dislocation of the already established social and political order, and the consequences are evident in the form of political unrest in Nigeria and authoritarianism in Tanzania. On the economic front, both countries emerged as largely cash-crop-producing economies with no substantive development of the industrial sector. This, in turn, has facilitated the continuous dominance of foreign monopoly capital. To make matters worse, up until date, these countries still lack the institutional framework to gainfully absorb the flow of foreign capital. The inability to generate returns on capital has brought about the ever-growing indebtedness rather than growth and development to the two countries under review.

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